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Abstract   
„App platforms” are electronic software distribution markets for mobile devices like smartphones or 
tablets. They have gained popularity after Apple launched its AppStore in 2008. Since then, app 
platforms have transformed the entire mobile communication industry including mobile network 
operators, device producers, software suppliers, content providers, advertisers, etc. 
Platforms (like AppStore) that intermediate between two distinct groups of customers connected 
through indirect network effects can be analyzed effectively using the theory of two-sided markets. The 
interdependencies of customers, platforms and developers require consideration of strategic issues not 
present in traditional models. These issues may pertain to all development phases, including platform 
design, launch and competition and thus, have an effect on existing and new business models in this 
sector. 
Economics literature on two-sided markets focuses on theoretical analysis, paying not much attention 
to managerial implications. Strategic management literature, on the other hand, rather provides 
practical guidelines. Within this paper, we discuss strategic issues arising in the app platform 
industry, combining these streams of literature. Based on a thorough analysis of the key stakeholders 
in the app platform industry (platform owner, developers, and users), we use our findings to provide 
management recommendations and discuss probable evolutions of the industry. 
 





„App platforms” are electronic software distribution platforms for mobile devices like smartphones or 
tablets. They have gained popularity after Apple launched its AppStore in July 2008. Since then, app 
platforms have transformed the entire mobile communication industry including mobile network 
operators, device producers, software suppliers, content providers, advertisers and so on (Taylor, 
2009). Although the advantage of AppStore seemed to be incontestable, other app platforms like 
Google's Android market managed to enter the market and achieve high popularity (comScore 
Reports, 2011). More platforms followed Apple and Google, forming coalitions and trying to create 
niche markets. This lead to differentiation and further development of the business model. 
App platforms are not a single example but a part of a large-scale change. During the last decade, 
platforms became the „invisible engines“ of our economies (Evans et al., 2006). Amazon, eBay, and 
Google have advanced to top brands worldwide. Following Gawer and Cusumano (2007: 2), we define 
platforms as „systems of technologies that combine core components with complementary products 
and services usually made by a variety of firms. “ Platforms spread across many industries, leading to 
creation of new business areas and products. Moreover, they change the whole economic structure and 
influence business strategies in fundamental ways. 
The underlying structure of platforms is that of a network with the crucial feature of network effects. 
That is, participants' profit depends on the number of other participants in the market (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985; Farell and Saloner, 1985). Direct network effects (or same-side effects) occur between 
members of the same customer group, for instance, the more participants join a telephone network, the 
more people can be reached, the higher is the utility of a single participant. Indirect network effects (or 
cross-side effects) occur between members of the disjunct groups like developers and users. That is, 
the more developers join a platform, the higher is users' benefit. Strategic management literature on 
platform management (e.g. Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Eisenmann, 2007) provides practical 
guidelines on how to deal with these effects. However, it does not provide an adequate theoretical 
framework to thoroughly analyze the complex interactions. Economic literature, on the other hand, 
focuses on the theoretical aspects of two-sided markets, and is not so much devoted to the managerial 
implications of these theories. With this paper, we aim to bring these two streams of literature closer 
together. The main contribution of our paper is then the applications of the theoretical findings to the 
app platform industry: We show what strategic decisions are most important in the different life-cycles 
stages of an app platform. We will cover mainly the app platform owner's perspective, leaving 
developers' and customers' perspectives for future research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start with a literature review on platform 
analysis and two-sided market models in section 2. Subsequently, we consider app platforms for 
mobile devices in section 3. Section 4 pertains to strategic issues and insights structured according to 
the three life cycle phases (design, launch, and competition). Although we focus on app platforms for 
mobile devices as an underlying industry, the insights apply to many other Internet-based platforms. 
Section 5 concludes and points out interesting aspects for further research 
2 Literature Review and Background 
In this section we provide the background for platform analysis. We begin with a short literature 
overview on platforms and two-sided markets and then explain the key economic principles of two-
sided market models. The focus is on understanding the main features and their implications. 
2.1 Platforms 
In recent years, in many (especially high-tech) industries, platform competition became a key element 
(Evans et al., 2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Hidding et al. (2011) identify four fundamental 
drivers for the rise of platforms: Modularity, increased interconnectivity, self-organization, and low 
marginal cost of production.  Given the increased number of industries with platform character, it is 
not surprising that management literature on this topic is growing. Main research directions include 
network analysis, platform competition, and management of complementors, which will be described 
shortly in the following paragraphs. 
In the literature on networks, platforms perform a key role among actors (Eaton et al., 2010). 
Platforms, as a bottleneck, may constrain the overall performance (Baldwin and Clark, 2006) and limit 
the service level of the network (Teece, 1986). On the other hand, the gate keeping position allows the 
platform owner to extract a significant proportion of the economic value of the network (Baldwin and 
Clark (2006)) and thus sustain a competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). Basole (2009) shows how a 
structural analysis of networks can be used to visualize the ecosystem of actors. This can be used to 
identify a platform's competitive position and characterize its business strategy. 
The literature on platform competition addresses what business and technology decisions help 
companies to become and to stay platform leaders (Gawer and Cusumanu, 2008). While there is a 
certain advantage of being first to market (established customer base, switching costs, network 
effects), Hidding et al. (2011) find that in their sample of 15 platform industries, only in one market 
the first mover is still the leader. Successful followers mainly used a „platform envelopment strategy“ 
(Eisenmann et al., 2007), which means that the entrant combines its own functionality with the leader's 
platform in order to leverage shared user relationships and common components. 
Companies providing complementary services are crucial, since they significantly enhance the 
platform's value. Platforms owners should therefore pay close attention to how they attract and 
manage their complementors. In an extensive case study on Intel's strategy, Gawer and Henderson 
(2007) find that Intel established a good balance of encouraging entry, despite the fact that Intel has 
the potential to „squeeze“ entrants ex post. Related to this issue is the level of openness of a platform. 
Parker and van Alstyne (2009) analyze the tension between innovation and open access. In essence, 
they find that the platform sponsor has to establish a balance between fostering platform adoption and 
complementary investment versus capturing immediate profits on the platform itself. Eisenmann 
(2007) analyzes factors that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing new platforms. 
For the subsequent life-cycle stages (network mobilization and platform maturity) he explains how 
management challenges differ between these two types of platforms. 
While the strategic management literature clearly provides several valuable recommendations for 
platform management, it does not provide an adequate theoretical framework to fully describe the 
complex network interactions. Therefore, we now turn to the (more theory-based) economic literature 
on two-sided markets.  
2.2 Two-sided markets 
Two-sided markets can be roughly defined as platforms that enable interaction between two groups of 
customers that value each other's presence (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Evans, 2003; Tag, 2008). The 
research on two-sided markets stems from network economics and complementary product pricing (cf. 
Rochet and Tirole, 2003). One of the key concepts for two-sided markets is that of „indirect network 
effects“: The utility on the one side of the market increases with the number (and/or quality) of 
participants on the other side. Due to the diversity of two-sided market examples (e.g. credit cards, 
night clubs, shopping malls) various extensions are needed to describe different kinds of platforms. 
A large body of literature on two-sided markets has emerged during the last decade, for example, 
Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Evans (2003) and Armstrong (2006), to 
name just a few. A lot of new extensions to the original models were introduced (see Armstrong 
(2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) on membership fees, Hagiu (2009), Jeon and Rochet (2010) on 
quality preferences, Tag (2008) on comparison of open and closed platforms); 
Two-sided market models are usually based on three equations: the platform profit equation and the 
two utility equations for the two market sides (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). All of them can have a 
membership and a usage part. Membership benefits, fees and costs are induced only once, usage 
benefits, fees, and costs are recurring and depend on the number of transactions, e.g., downloads. 
The key insight used in two-sided market models is that the solution does not only depend on the total 
fee level, but on the pricing structure. Traditional economic intuition suggests that if prices for both 
sides are equal in the beginning, a price increase is more effective on the side with a steeper demand 
curve, while a reduction will be more effective on the side with the less steep curve. This still holds for 
the two-sided markets. What is new in the two-sided market theory, is that in equilibrium, the ratio of 
fees for the two market sides should be proportional to the ratio of their price elasticities (not the other 
way around). The side with the lower price elasticity pays less than the other side and is even often 
subsidized („subsidy side“) to attract the other side („money side“). 
For the model to reflect the app platforms structure, the basic model by Rochet and Tirole (2003) must 
be adjusted. We have to consider additional parameters and extensions like usage fees, membership 
fees (Armstrong, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2006), segmentation of participants, commission payments 
and adjustments for the number of interactions (Kouris, 2011). Understanding the impact of these 
extensions is key for addressing challenges pertaining to app platform stakeholders. 
For the competition between platforms multi-homing is an important issue. „Multi-homing“ refers to 
the situation when participants might join more than one platform (Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), 
Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Sun and Tse (2007)).  Each market participant can 
choose between three possibilities: do not join any platform, join only one platform („single-homing“) 
or join more than one platform („multi-homing“). The single-homing behavior can be driven by 
requirements imposed by platforms, like exclusive contracts. Alternatively, it can be driven by costs of 
multi-homing, for instance, when platforms are incompatible or require high membership fees.  
Another key factor for the platform competition are same-side effects. There are networks with 
positive same side effect, for instance, for the computer users, file exchange is only possible if they 
work with the same (or a compatible) operating system. For many networks, they are negative due to 
crowding out and increasing competition: the more developers participate on a platform, the lower the 
attention a single developer is getting. For app platforms both effects exist. 
Given the theoretical insights of this stream of literature, we now aim to derive managerial 
implications for app platforms, using also the findings of the strategic management literature on 
platforms. Therefore, we first describe the app platform industry and the key stakeholders. 
Consequently, we discuss how insights from the two-sided market theory can be applied to address 
strategic challenges arising in the app platform industry and how they affect business models in these 
markets. 
3 App platforms 
App platforms are a special form of electronic markets. Via app platforms software developers can 
distribute their software applications (apps) among users of mobile devices. Hence, developers and 
users are indirectly connected: developers get profit from the users purchasing their apps and users 
benefit from the apps. The groups are not disjunct, since some users are also developers and many 
developers are also users, but they are distinct enough. Due to these direct and indirect network 
effects, app platforms can be analyzed using two-sided market theory. In this section we provide 
background information on app platforms and show, which parameters from the two-sided market 
theory are relevant for app platforms. The industry overview and the description of key stakeholders 
create a basis for understanding key challenges and issues of the industry. 
3.1 Industry overview 
Apple's AppStore and Google's Android market are probably the most known app platforms. Actually, 
there are many more app platforms than these two – and some of them were founded as early as 1999. 
For example, Handango provides apps for mobile phones since 1999. But it was not until the AppStore 
appeared that the app platforms have gained momentum. Several hypotheses can be provided to 
explain why it was not before 2008 that app platforms have gained momentum, for example, usability 
(size of screen), connectivity (3G and 4G coverage) or the hardware price could have contributed to 
the app platform development. The launch of AppStore has changed the mobile phone industry in 
practically all dimensions. After three years in the market there were 425,000 apps available in the 
AppStore. The number of downloads exceeded 14,000,000,000 (Apple, 2011)). 
The app platform industry as a whole was doing well in 2011, growing by around 78% and reaching 
around USD 4 billion in revenues. Apple managed to stay the market leader, accounting for 75% of 
the total market revenues, by far outpacing other market participants. Also projections for the future 
are positive: Total revenue is estimated to jump to USD 5.6 billion in 2012, USD 6.9 billion in 2013 
and USD 8.3 billion in 2014 (Kent, 2011). In 2011, Apple, Google, Nokia and RIM were the most 
important players in the market. Apple will probably remain the leader for the next 2-3 years, but other 
platforms will also gain traction. Android has currently high market shares in the smartphone market 
(53% in the USA) and high sales (e.g., 61% in Germany in 2011). Windows and Nokia are constantly 
losing market share (Nokia from around 70% in 2006 to fewer than 30% in 2011 number of handsets 
worldwide), however, together they have an interesting value proposition for the future. Due to 
consolidation and merging of mobile devices and computers, Windows can become the key player in 
this process. Nokia has the capacity to produce low-cost devices that can boost sales as soon as the 
high-end market is saturated (Virki, 2012). 
3.2 Business models and key stakeholders 
In this section, we provide a brief description of app platform business models and operations. There 
are three key types of participants on app platforms: the platform owner, developers, and users. 
Platform owners connect developers and users and provide rules and services. Developers program 
apps and submit them to the platform, so that the users can download them. In the following, we 
describe each group of participants in detail. 
App platform owners provide the whole infrastructure (like user interface, server space, etc.) and 
determine rules for the interaction between the two market sides. They can also provide information 
about apps and developers and serve as a trusted third party by controlling app quality. Following 
Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) we call the business model used by platforms an intermediary business 
model. They distinguish between 4 major roles of intermediaries: dealer (resells goods), platform 
operator (connects sellers and buyers), infomediary (facilitates information gathering and procession), 
and trusted third party (certification agent). Many platforms have chosen a hybrid business model. The 
main difference between a dealer and a platform operator is that the latter does not control the 
transaction price in a direct way by buying and reselling products, they rather charge for the platform 
membership and transactions. App platform owners are platform operators in the first place, some 
combine it with infomediary and/or trusted third party roles. Neglecting some roles by certain 
(prominent) players leaves room for entrants in this market to fulfill these duties. 
App platforms can be classified in various ways. Based on Distimo (2011), we divide app platforms 
into 4 categories: native platforms, pure mobile device manufacturers, mobile network operators, and 
independent. Compared to Distimo, we suggest differentiating between native platforms (who provide 
operating system and hardware) and pure mobile device manufacturers instead of device 
manufacturers versus operating system developers. Our classification allows to take into account the 
fact that many successful app platforms provide both, the hardware and the operating system (Apple, 
BlackBerry, Nokia/Windows). Moreover, there are key strategic differences between companies 
offering an integrated experience like Apple and BlackBerry versus those providing only hardware 
like HTC. For instance, if an app platform provides an operating system and/or mobile hardware, it 
can more easily assess whether apps would work well on their system. Hence, their own apps are 
better adjusted to the other parts, can offer better functionality and they can also review third-party 
apps with less effort. Mobile network operators have already a customer base and a billing system in 
place, so that they can gain customers for the new products like apps fast and/or they can take over 
payment procedure. 
Native (or integrated) platforms belong to the largest (in terms of available apps and downloads) and 
have the highest impact on the industry so far. These app platforms are built around different operating 
systems and use different programming languages and software tools. Hence, compatibility is very 
low. This is important for multi-homing and has an impact on the market structure. Due to the 
explosion in the number of app platforms, challenges around platform competition are currently in the 
focus of the app platform industry. However, there are also new platforms that get launched. For these 
new entrants platform launch and design are most important. But also incumbent platforms should 
from time to time re-evaluate their design and consider adjustments in the pricing and/or quality in 
order to deter entrance of new platforms and stay competitive.  
Developers program apps, which they submit to the app platform. In general, they are entitled to 
choose app prices themselves. There are different pricing strategies, including „simply buy it“, „in-
app-purchase“ and financing through advertisement (Gans, 2012). Key instruments to extract revenues 
is that of versioning (lite vs. prime), free trials and personification (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The 
first challenge for many developers is the question, which platform to join. App platforms do not 
require single-homing (limitation to one platform), i.e., developers are allowed to develop for more 
than one platform. Since apps are information goods (Shapiro and Varian, 1999), the main costs are 
the fixed costs of programming, marginal costs are basically zero. But transition to another platform 
causes costs of around 50% of the development cost due to the differences in programming language, 
operating system and hardware. The possibilities to program universal apps that run on all platforms 
are still very limited (Newel, 2011)).  
The other market side of an app platform consists of its users. They determine which apps are 
successful and, in the end, they decide which ecosystem will win. App platform users access the 
platform through their mobile devices. Mobile devices are complementary goods and can be 
considered a one-time membership fee. The features of mobile devices are key for the consumer 
experience, they determine which apps can be installed and used. For the users, not only the apps 
count, they rather see their mobile device and the software on it as a whole. Value and benefits are 
determined by the ecosystem. 
4 Key strategic issues and insights 
Business models based on two-sided markets require consideration of strategic issues not present in 
traditional models. In the following, we analyze what characteristics of app platforms are particularly 
affected by the factors described in section 2. We structure our arguments along the three life cycle 
stages described in Eisenmann (2007):  platform design, launch, and competition. 
4.1 Platform design 
From a strategic perspective, it is first necessary to check the criteria for a product to become a 
platform. Gawer and Cusumano (2007) argue that a product needs to (i) perform one essential function 
or solves one essential problem for several actors in an industry, (ii) be easy to connect or build-upon, 
and (iii) is difficult to substitute for. Clearly, the leading app platforms satisfy these criteria. In order to 
make the platform successful, the authors then recommend a „coring strategy“, which aims at making 
the platform the „core“ of a technological system. That was exactly the strategy implemented by 
Apple when they realized the potential of AppStore: Before its launch the mobile industry was 
organized around mobile devices and mobile network operators, with device features and network 
coverage being the key differentiation factors. Since the AppStore launch, the mobile industry 
structure changed profoundly, now having software (operating system plus apps) in the core (GfK, 
2010). Hence, app platforms have recognized the importance of the coring strategy and managed to 
apply it, arranging the whole mobile industry around them. Once this consideration is taken into 
account, other important platform design issues should be considered, like pricing and quality settings. 
It is a non-trivial decision, which side to subsidize (Eisenmann et al., 2006). For instance, in the video 
game industry the consoles are sold to the users at or even below cost („subsidy side“). The 
developer's side is the „money side“ and has to pay high royalties for the games development. In the 
personal computer industry the situation is reversed: users pay high prices for the operating system 
software while developers obtain free software development kits. The differences can be even 
observed within one and the same industry – Apple tried to charge developers a USD 10,000 for the 
Mac software development kit, but was not successful with this strategy having lost market shares in 
mid 1990s to Windows and open source operating systems. On app platforms, we observe that users 
are usually the „subsidy side“ and developers are the „money side“. Clearly, there are differences 
between the platforms. Apple charges USD 600-800 for the iPad which costs around USD 300 in 
production, Amazon charges only USD 200 for its Fire tablet – which is below manufacturing cost. 
Amazon is aspiring to install another business model, extracting even more revenues from developers. 
Hence, we observe that even within the app platform industry, there are different business models, but 
most try to extract more revenues from the developers. 
The second question pertains to the different kinds of fees that are applicable. In different industries 
different kinds of fees are used. The two kinds that were considered in the two-sided markets literature 
are membership fees (one-time or periodical) and usage fees. The membership fee (also called lump 
sum, or access fee) is applied independently of interactions between the market sides. The membership 
is especially helpful if transactions between participants cannot be observed, like on partner search 
platforms. Usage fees apply per transaction. 
Usually, it depends on the cost structure, what kind of fees should be used. Here not only the platform 
cost structure but also the developers' cost and revenue structure is important. Usually, for information 
goods like apps fixed costs are high and marginal cost are almost zero, or as Shapiro and Varian 
(1999: 21) put it, „information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce.“ Contrarily, revenues are 
obtained on a per-download basis. Generally, information goods like apps should be priced not based 
on the production costs, but based on the value to the customers (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Thus, app 
platforms can participate in the developers' success best if they charge a per transaction commission. 
Besides the optimal price setting and allocation, quality of apps is an important issue. In the computer 
console and game industry, game developers pay high royalties to the game console producers. This is 
(at least partially) to ensure that low-quality games are not profitable and to exclude them from the 
platform (Hagiu, 2009). Also for app platforms quality belongs to the key platform design factors. For 
users it is important that downloaded apps at least do not contain malware, viruses, and spyware. That 
is the first level of quality differentiation – and it is objective. The next level is that of usability and 
content quality of apps. This may be perceived differently, and is therefore subjective. App platforms 
differ in their attitude towards certification of the apps quality. Apple is known for its quite rigorous 
approach: they review all apps before placing them in the AppStore. Other platforms like Android 
market do not have a pre-placement review process, but they delete low-quality apps once in a while. 
In addition to these kinds of quality-certification processes, every app platform has a ranking 
mechanism in place so that users might indicate the subjectively perceived app quality by rating and 
commenting it. 
Theoretical analysis shows that on two-sided markets the side requiring higher quality (consumers) 
should be subsidized (Hagiu, 2009; Eisenmann et al., 2006). In reality, we observe that on platforms 
where a quality review process is installed (e.g. AppStore), app developers pay more. The exclusion of 
the low quality apps leads to higher benefits for users, larger customer base, and through the indirect 
network effects, to higher interest in developing for the high-quality platform. One more benefit for 
developers is that negative same-side effects are reduced through exclusion, reducing the congestion 
problem. Regarding platform quality, no general advice that would fit every situation can be given. 
However, it is crucial for platforms to decide whether they would be differentiated by quality or 
quantity. Those that cannot decide, can be easily dominated by other platforms in the one direction or 
the other. 
4.2 Platform launch 
The so-called „chicken & egg“-problem is the main issue during the launch phase. Caillaud and Jullien 
(2003) have used this expression in their first paper on two-sided markets. The key challenge on two-
sided markets is that a platform must get both customer sides on board to do business. But as long as 
there are no users, no developers would join and vice versa. As explained in section 2.2 platform 
owners' revenues consist of two parts, the membership and the usage part. When the usage component 
is too small due to low numbers of participants, the membership part can be sufficient to get the 
platform up and running. For that to happen, the membership component of utility and profit equations 
must be high enough to compensate for low usage benefits. This provides an explanation also for the 
phenomenal success of Apple's AppStore or Amazon's market place. Due to high membership 
benefits, they managed to attract users first, and then developers and independent sellers followed very 
fast. The first implication for the platform operators is, that new entrants may avoid the „chicken & 
egg“ problem“ by charging low membership fees and providing high membership benefits. The 
second implication is that later on, platforms might want to reassess their pricing strategy and adjust 
pricing. In reality, we have not yet observed any major price changes. This could be an interesting 
avenue for research (and also for the industry), to evaluate whether such changes would be profitable 
and feasible in the current situation. 
Once the platform is launched, openness of the platform appears to be a key strategic decision in a 
two-sided market (Rysman, 2009). Most app platform owners pursue a proprietary strategy, which 
means they have full control over the platform and therefore can capture most of the added value 
themselves. Following Eisenmann (2007), this is the right strategy for leaders in the market. 
Followers, however, might choose a more open, collaborative approach (i.e., cooperating with 
competitors or complementors) in order to differentiate and exert competitive pressure. 
When entering into an also existing market, it is of strategic importance if the remaining market is still 
big enough to create substantial network effects or if it is possible to attract customers and developers 
from the existing platforms. Eisenmann et al. (2007) and Hidding et al. (2011) describe platform 
envelopment as a promising strategy for followers. Google successfully linked many platform markets 
to its search platform (like Google Docs or Chrome) and naturally also used this position to support 
Android. Through indirect network effects, market share of developers also affects users. As some key 
developers (Cheezburger Network, Foursquare) considered Microsoft's market share too small to 
justify development of a new app for the Windows Phone, Microsoft reacted by incentivizing 
developers. Not only did Microsoft provide developers with free phones and prime spots in its app 
store, in some cases Microsoft even financed the app development (Wortham and Wingfield, 2012). 
This is similar to the strategy of in-house complements described in Eisenmann (2007). 
4.3 Platform competition 
Many managers in the mobile industry wonder whether app platforms will show the „winner-takes-
all“ dynamics or allow for existence of several competitors. This question is crucial for all business 
areas around mobile ecosystems. Winner-takes-all dynamics emerges due to network effects and 
increasing returns to scale. For instance, the market for keyboards is 100% dominated by the 
„qwerty“-keyboard (with small variations). On the video market, VHS format wiped out Sony's 
Betamax video format. At the same time, there are markets where several platforms coexist. For 
instance, there are several web-browsers like Mozilla Firefox, Safari, Chrome, Internet Explorer. Also 
the market for the computer operating systems is divided between several companies (Windows, iOS, 
Linux and Unix). The crucial question is then, how to decide whether the „winner-takes-all“ dynamic 
will occur in the app platform market or not. 
There are 4 conditions that follow from the two-sided market theory and make the „winner-takes-all“ 
dynamics probable (see Eisenmann et al., 2006; Sun and Tse, 2007): 
1. It is costly to multi-home – at least for one market side, 
2. There are high indirect network effects – at least for the side with high multi-homing costs, 
3. Same-side effects are not negative and strong, that is, the congestion effect is not too high, 
4. The goods are rather homogeneous and there is no demand for differentiation. 
The first condition pertains to multi-homing. To „multi-home“ means to have access to more than one 
platform as explained in section 2.2. If platforms are not perfectly compatible, multi-homing incurs 
costs, like additional equipment or the time necessary to learn how to use other platforms. In case of 
app platforms the incompatibility is quite high: different app platforms use different operating 
systems, different programming languages and they run on different mobile devices with different 
functionality. For instance, it is costly to port an app that was created for iOS to Android or Windows. 
Developers must possess both programming languages and know the differences between them. They 
also must know the differences in the operating systems and in the middleware of both platforms. 
Additionally, developers have to buy hardware and for some platforms, membership fees must be 
paid. For consumers, multi-homing costs are also high. In order to use more than one native app 
platform, users have to purchase and carry more than one mobile device, which would be 
incompatible. In addition, there is a lock-in effect: if a user has spent some money and time for the 
apps on the one platform, she might be reluctant to switch the system. Altogether we can conclude that 
the cost of multi-homing is quite high for both market sides on app platforms. That supports 
consolidation of the market toward a single platform. 
Developers can only make profits if there are users who would download and buy their apps. Hence, 
indirect network effects are relatively high. That causes the participants of the app market to converge 
to one platform. Once there is a clear leader, other platforms' chances to get enough customers 
diminish. Vogelsang (2010) shows that these network effects increase the possibility of entry 
deterrence by incumbents. As a consequence, the market leader does not exploit monopoly profits in 
early stages of the market, but rather in more mature stage. Hence, the second condition applies as 
well and reinforces consolidation. 
The effect of the third condition is not as clear as that of the first two. On the developers' side, there 
are negative same-side effects, since they prefer to have fewer competitors. With more than half a 
million apps on a platform, the marginal visibility and utility of an additional app diminishes. Then 
other things like quality and variety of apps and good platform infrastructure become more and more 
important. On the users' side, there are positive same-side effect: people can share apps and 
communicate easily. For instance, they may use the same chat apps, some of which are also platform-
specific, e.g., BlackBerry messenger. Altogether we can say that negative same-side effect might work 
against platform consolidation. 
The fourth condition implies that if different features are needed, there might be room for niche 
building and therefore for more than one platform. Hence, the effect of the fourth condition is also not 
obvious. On the users' side, there are different customer segments: there are, for instance, business 
customers with preference for security, very high quality, and ability to pay for it on the one hand, on 
the other hand, there are budgeters who are not willing to pay much, and nerds who want the 
opportunity to adjust apps as they wish, etc. All these customer groups have different needs. While it 
is possible to serve all of them on one platform, it allows for specialized platforms to co-exist. Also 
developers are different, for instance, in terms of their motives (Harhoff et al., 2003). Hence, there are 
still opportunities for niche-building and co-existence of several platforms. 
The factors discussed above arise from the two-sided market theory and impact the app platforms' 
business models and strategy. Besides these factors, there are several other aspects that are not part of 
two-sided market theory but must be taken into account when talking about app platforms' strategies. 
These are for instance, brand image of the platform owner and the platform ecosystem, possible 
disruptions like new coalitions between key players, new mobile devices, trends from the neighboring 
industries like smart home, and question regarding possible vertical integration. These aspects must be 
taken into account when considering strategic issued on app platforms. 
Summarizing all said in this subsection, we can conclude that the app platform industry shows a high 
tendency towards convergence but it leaves room for niche building and differentiation. Moreover, 
this market is subject to a wide range of innovations, including technologies and services. It is crucial 
to develop unique features, bundle products, and provide incentives to complementors to innovate in 
order to stay competitive. Gawer and Cusumano (2008) call this a „tipping strategy“ for platform 
owners. The key issue for the incumbent app platforms is to push further for consolidation. Possible 
challengers have to look for their niche to be successful. And developers should not spread their 
resources too much and carefully scan the market for disruptions and trends towards consolidation. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed issues and strategies of the app platform industry from a two-sided 
market perspective. We combined the strategic management literature on platforms with the economic 
literature on two-sided markets in order to have a solid background for our analysis of the app 
platform industry. We have analyzed the current industry situation and trends, platform business 
model, and key stakeholders. Building on existing literature and the industry analysis, we have 
discussed key strategic issues in the app platform industry. Along the life cycle of a platform (launch, 
design, and competition) we developed several management recommendations and perspectives for 
this industry. 
We have seen that two-sided market business models require consideration of strategic issues not 
present in traditional models. These issues may pertain to all development phases, including platform 
design, launch, and competition. For platform design, pricing represents the key strategic challenge. 
Two-sided market theory suggests that in equilibrium fees should be proportional to the price 
elasticities (contrary to the usual economic intuition). Furthermore, it provides suggestions regarding 
kinds of fees to charge (usage, membership, one-time or periodical fees). Subsequently, we have 
discussed the impact of quality on platform design. Quality is besides prices the key parameter that 
determines platform design. On two-sided markets, the side that requires higher quality gets 
subsidized. During platform launch, the „chicken & egg“ problem occurs. Two-sided market theory 
helps to understand and reduce or avoid it through setting of an optimal membership component. 
Platform competition pertains to the possible market structure – „winner takes all“ dynamics and the 
number of competing platforms that can share the market. Four factors specific for the two-sided 
markets influence the market structure: multi-homing, size of indirect network effects, same-side 
effects, and differentiation opportunities. Our analysis points out that the app platform industry shows 
a high tendency towards convergence but leaves room for niche building and differentiation. The key 
implication for the incumbent app platforms is to push further for consolidation while possible 
challengers have to look for their niche to be successful. For developers it is crucial to scan the market 
for disruptions and trends towards consolidation in order to efficiently allocate their resources. 
For the future research agenda, we suggest three points for further investigation from a theoretical as 
well as from an applied perspective. The first pertains to the pricing strategy reassessment for different 
development phases, which seems to be recommendable from the theoretical point of view but is not 
observed in reality. However, as important as the pricing aspect in these markets appear, other factors, 
like creating a trustworthy relationship with complementors, encouraging internal and external 
innovation, and reacting strategically to competitors' actions (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002) must not 
be neglected. The second aspect concerns empirical evaluation of compliance to the fee allocation 
rule. This requires empirical estimation of price elasticities of the two market sides on different app 
platforms. The third factor that appears interesting is the level of openness (Eisenmann (2007) and the 
strategic perspective of developers. Collaboration of developers and openness of platform naturally 
has a big effect on this side of the market which deserves further analysis. 
Altogether, two-sided market theory proves to be helpful in addressing strategic issues of app 
platforms snd provides tools to analyze business models and during all development phases. 
References 
Apple (2009) Apple's App Store Downloads Top 1.5 Billion in First Year. Available at http://www. 
apple.com/pr/library. 
Apple (2011) Apple Keynote Address at the Worldwide Developer Conference in June 2011.  
Armstrong, M. (2006) Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, 
No. 3, pp. 668-691. 
Armstrong, M., Wright, J. (2007) Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts. 
Economic Theory, Vol. 32, pp. 353-380. 
Baldwin, C.Y, Clark, K.B. (2006) Architectural Innovation and Dynamic Competition: The Smaller 
„Footprint“ Strategy. Harvard Business School Working Paper #07-014.  
Basole, R. (2009) Visualization of interfirm relations in a converging mobile ecosystem. Journal of 
Information Technology, Vol. 24, pp.144-159. 
Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M. (2010) Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Caillaud, B., Jullien, B. (2003) Chicken & egg: competition among intermediation service providers. 
The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 309-328. 
comScore Reports (2011) U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market Share.  
Cusumano, M.A., Gawer, A. (2002) The elements of platform leadership. MIT Sloan Management 
Review, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 51-58. 
Distimo (2011) Distimo report. 
Eaton, B.D., Elaluf-Calderwood,S.M., Sörensen, C. (2010) A Methodology for Analysing Business 
Model Dynamics for Mobile Services using Control Points and Triggers. Business Models for 
Mobile Platforms, Berlin. 
Eisenmann, T. (2007) Managing Proprietary and Shared Platforms: A Life-Cycle View. Harvard 
Business School Working Paper #07-105. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., van Alstyne, M. (2006): Strategies for Two-Sided Markets. Harvard 
Business Review, October. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., van Alstyne, M. (2007), Platform envelopment. Harvard Business School 
Working Paper # 07-104.  
Evans, D.S. (2003) Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries. Review of Network 
Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 191-209. 
Evans, D.S., Hagiu, A., Schmalensee, R. (2006) Invisible engines – how software platforms drive 
innovation and transform industries. The MIT Press. 
Farago, (2011) App Developers Bet on iOS over Android this Holiday Season. Available at 
http://blog.flurry.com/bid/79061/App-Developers-Bet-on-iOS-over-Android-this-Holiday-Season. 
Farell, J., Saloner, G. (1985) Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation. Rand Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 70–83. 
Gans, J. (2012) Mobile Application Pricing. Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 
52-59. 
Gawer, A., Cusumano, M.A. (2007): A strategy toolkit for platform leader wannabes. Working paper, 
presented at the DRUID summer conference 2007.  
Gawer, A., Cusumano, M.A. (2008) How Companies Become Platform Leaders. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, Vol.49, No. 2, pp. 27-35. 
Gawer, A., Henderson, R. (2007) Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: 
Evidence from Intel. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-34. 
GfK (2010) GfK Research: New Consumer Mindset Driving Smartphone Products and Services 
Purchases. GfK press release. 
Hagiu, A. (2009) Quantity vs. quality and exclusion by two-sided platforms. Harvard Business School, 
Working paper #09-094. 
Harhoff, D., Henkel, J., von Hippel, E. (2003) Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: how 
users benefit by freely revealing their innovations. Research Policy, 32(10), 1753-1769. 
Hidding, G.J., Williams, J., Sviokla, J.J. (2011) How platform leaders win. Journal of Business 
Strategy, Vol. 32, No. 2 pp. 29-37. 
Jeon, D.-S., Rochet, J.-C. (2010) The pricing of academic journals: a two-sided market perspective. 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 222-255. 
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C. (1985) Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility. The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3, pp. 424-440. 
Kent, J. (2011) Revenue for Major Mobile App Stores to Rise 77.7 Percent in 2011. Available at 
http://www.isuppli.com/media-research/news/pages/revenue-for-major-mobile-app-stores-to-rise-
77-7-percent-in-2011.aspx. 
Kouris, I. (2011) Unified two-sided market model. Working paper, Venice Intertic Conference 2011.  
Newel, D. (2011) Developing Mobile Apps for Multiple Platforms. Available at 
http://www.getelastic.com/developing-mobile-apps-for-multiple-platforms/. 
Parker, G., van Alstyne, M. (2009) Six Challenges in Platform Licensing and Open Innovation, 
Communications & strategies, 74, p. 17-36. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1559013. 
Porter, M.E. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. The Free 
Press. 
Prosper Mobile Insights (2011), Android vs iPhone/iOS: Quick Facts.  
Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J. (2003) Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 990-1029. 
Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J. (2006) Two-sided markets: a progress report. The RAND Journal of 
economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 645-667. 
Rysman, M. (2009) The Economics of Two-Sided Markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 23, 
No. 3, pp. 125-143. 
Shapiro, C., Varian, H.R. (1999) Information rules: a strategic guide to the network economy. Harvard 
Business School Press. Boston, Massachusetts. 
Sun, M., Tse, E. (2007) When does the winner take all in two-sided markets? Review of Network 
Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 16-40. 
Tag, J. (2008) Essays on platforms – business strategies, regulation and policy in telecommunications, 
media and technology industries. Ekonomi och samhälle, # 188. 
Taylor, P. (2009) The pick of the free apps. Financial Times.  
Teece, D. (1986) Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, collaboration, 
licensing and public policy. Research Policy, Vol. 15,  285-305. 
Virki, T. (2012) Nokia buys Norwegian startup Smarterphone for low-end push. Available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/06/us-nokia-acquisition-idUSTRE8051OJ20120106. 
Vogelsang, M. (2010) Dynamics of Two-sided Internet Markets. International Economics and 
Economic Policy, Vol. 7, 129-145. 
Wortham, J., Wingfield, N. (2012) Microsoft Is Writing Checks to Fill Out Its App Store, New York 
Times.  
